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Abstract 
This research takes a dynamic view on the knowledge coordination process, aiming to explain 
how the process is affected by changes in the operating environment, from normal situations to 
emergencies in traditional and fast-response organizations, and why these changes occur. We 
first conceptualize the knowledge coordination process by distinguishing between four 
dimensions – what, when, how and who – that together capture the full scope of the knowledge 
coordination process. We use these dimensions to analyze knowledge coordination practices and 
the activities constituting these practices, in the IT functions of traditional and fast-response 
(military) organizations where we distinguish between “normal” and “emergency” operating 
conditions. Our findings indicate that (i) inter-relationships between knowledge coordination 
practices change under different operating conditions, and (ii) the patterns of change are 
different in traditional and fast-response organizations.  
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Introduction 
Knowledge coordination has been recognized as an important stream of Coordination Theory that focuses 
on “knowledge” as one of the objects of coordinative action (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Scholars have 
highlighted challenges associated with the coordination of specialized knowledge that is distributed 
between individuals in co-located or virtual teams (e.g., Faraj and Sproull 2000; Kanawattanachai and 
Yoo 2007, respectively), with particular attention given to non-traditional organizations that are fluid, 
emergent and ambiguous (Callon 1998; Faraj and Xiao 2006; Kellogg et al. 2006). The complexity 
involved in knowledge work has steered theories associated with knowledge coordination away from the 
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traditional coordination theory that focuses on modes of coordination and task interdependencies 
(Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). A prime example is provided by Faraj and Xiao (2006) who re-framed the 
concept of coordination to accommodate the nature of knowledge-intensive work. They argued that “for 
environments where knowledge work is interdisciplinary and highly contextualized, the relevant lens is 
one of practice. Practices emerge from an ongoing stream of activities and are enacted through 
contextualized actions of individuals (Orlikowski 2000)” (Faraj and Xiao 2006:1157).  
 Scholars have studied knowledge coordination by adopting a practice-based perspective, to 
enhance the understanding of how complex and highly interdependent work can effectively be 
coordinated in different knowledge-intensive organizational settings. This emergent work on knowledge 
coordination has focused on studying practices that enable organizational members to overcome specific 
boundaries associated with the unique organizational setting they are part of. Examples include various 
post-bureaucratic organizations such as cross-functional collaborations (Kellogg et al. 2006); globally 
distributed teams (Kotlarsky et al. 2014; Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Orlikowski 2002); online 
communities (Faraj et al. 2011); new product development teams (Carlile 2002; Carlile 2004); ego-
centered networks of professionals protecting national security (Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak 2008); 
emergency response teams (Faraj and Xiao 2006); and emergent groups responding to disasters 
(Majchrzak et al. 2007). 
 While these studies are influential in setting the scene for further theory development on 
knowledge coordination, they provide a static view on knowledge coordination practices associated with 
specific types of organizations. In reality, however, organizations operate under different circumstances as 
they dynamically respond to changes in their political, economic, business, cultural, and social 
environments. Any organization, whether it is a traditional organization (e.g., a chain of retail shops) or a 
fast-response organization1 (e.g., an Accidents and Emergency (A&E) unit in a hospital, a fire brigade, or a 
police department), faces times of more pressure (e.g., pre-Christmas periods for shops, or weekends for 
A&E units), which have implications for the way an organization operates in order to deal with the 
pressure and/or emergency. Therefore, it is naïve to assume that the enactment of knowledge 
coordination practices will remain the same under different operating conditions. We, therefore, build on 
previous work that studied knowledge coordination practices in different organizational settings by 
focusing on how knowledge coordination practices change under different organizational circumstances.  
 In addressing our overarching theoretical concerns, we develop the following research question to 
guide our empirical study: How is the process of knowledge coordination affected by changes in the 
operating environment – from normal situations to emergencies – in traditional and fast-response 
organizations? 
 To address this question we first conceptualize the knowledge coordination process by 
distinguishing between four dimensions – what, when, how, and who – that together capture the full 
scope of the knowledge coordination process. This conceptualization of knowledge coordination reflects a 
broader definition of coordination by Faraj and Xiao (2006:1157) as “a temporally unfolding and 
contextualized process of input regulation and interaction articulation to realize a collective performance” 
where “input” comes in the form of knowledge, as an object of coordinative action (Okhuysen et al. 2009). 
We use these dimensions to analyze knowledge coordination practices in the Information Technology (IT) 
functions of traditional and fast-response (more specifically, military) organizations where we distinguish 
between “normal” and “emergency” operating conditions. By adopting the practice lens we view the on-
going knowledge coordination process as taking place through a repertoire of knowledge coordination 
practices. Each practice is associated with a range of activities comprising the practice. This approach is 
consistent with past studies (Faraj and Xiao 2006; Kellogg et al. 2006; Leonardi and Bailey 2008; 
Orlikowski 2002).  
 The main contribution from this study is that it provides a dynamic perspective on knowledge 
coordination, and shows that a change from normal to emergency conditions has different effects for 
traditional versus fast-response organizations: in a traditional organization, emergencies create a 
tendency towards more improvised and informal knowledge coordination practices, whereas in a fast-
                                                             
1 Faraj and Xiao (2006) define a “fast-response organization” as an organization that operates under conditions of high uncertainty 
“where decisions must be made rapidly and where errors can be fatal” (p. 1155). 
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response organization the knowledge coordination practices become even more structured and 
formalized under emergency conditions.  
Theoretical Background: Knowledge Coordination under Different 
Conditions 
Traditional coordination theory usually focuses on one (dominant) dimension of coordination: the how 
(i.e., mode) of coordination. However, as Faraj and Xiao (2006) stressed, where knowledge-intensive 
work is concerned and the focus shifts to “knowledge” as the object of coordination, the what (content) 
and when (circumstances) of knowledge coordination become increasingly important. In particular, when 
dealing with specialized knowledge that is localized, situated, and embedded in practice, individuals from 
different organizational functions face difficulties associated with certain boundaries between different 
domains of knowledge (Carlile 2002). Different terminology, meaning, perspectives, and interests impede 
knowledge coordination, creating a need to clarify and agree on what knowledge is being coordinated. 
Furthermore, different knowledge boundaries create obstacles for communication between organizational 
members (Carlile 2004) which hinder knowledge coordination. However, there is no “one size fits all” 
approach to dealing with knowledge boundaries. Different boundaries require different approaches and 
specific techniques to transfer, translate, or transform knowledge across boundaries (Carlile 2004). 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between circumstances associated with a specific knowledge 
boundary in order to decide on the appropriate approach to coordinate knowledge across (a combination 
of) boundaries. Last but not least, identifying who (specific individual) is the right person to coordinate 
specific knowledge with is revealed as an important dimension of knowledge coordination, in particular in 
situations when tacit and personalized expertise is required (Kotlarsky et al. 2014; Majchrzak et al. 2007). 
Bringing these four dimensions together, the how, what, when, and who dimension of knowledge 
coordination, and integrating them into one dynamic practice-based perspective extends and 
complements current research on knowledge coordination.    
Knowledge Coordination Practices in Traditional and Fast-Response 
Organizations  
The type of organization (characterized by conditions under which an organization operates) has 
implications for the how, what, when, and who of the knowledge coordination process. In particular, 
Faraj and Xiao (2006) argued that traditional coordination theory has limited applicability for 
organizations that operate in a high-velocity environment, such as a fast-response organization. They 
claimed that “the dilemma of coordination in such settings is that, on the one hand, there is a need for 
tight structuring, formal coordination, and hierarchical decision making to ensure a clear division of 
responsibilities, prompt decision processes, and timely action; but, on the other hand, because of the need 
for rapid action and the uncertain environment, there is a competing need to rely on flexible structures, 
on-the-spot decision making, and informal coordination modes” (p. 1557). Faraj and Xiao (2006) defined 
a “fast-response organization” as an organization that operates under conditions of high uncertainty 
“where decisions must be made rapidly and where errors can be fatal” (p. 1155). It is more dynamic, able 
to improvise and has a higher ability to adapt to uncertain environments. A traditional organization, also 
known as a hierarchy or top-down structure, focuses on vertical structuring that is strictly defined by a 
chain of command. It is more bound by rule-based work processes and centralized decision making in a 
stable environment (Kellogg et al. 2006) than a fast-response organization. Even though a fast-response 
organization can also possess bureaucratic features, like a command and control structure, the way they 
operate under emergency conditions can differ as the impact of the emergency (error can be fatal) differs. 
Clearly, focusing on the coordination mode (the how question) alone does not help in an attempt to 
explain this phenomenon.  
 Faraj and Xiao (2006) emphasized that focusing on the what and when aspects of coordination 
helps us understand how individuals coordinate knowledge in fast-response organizations. Knowledge 
coordination, however, is a process that largely relies on people being aware of where certain knowledge 
and knowledge needs reside – in other words, on their knowing who has (a) particular expertise, and who 
needs to be informed about what (Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak 2008; Kotlarsky et al. 2014; Majchrzak et al. 
2007). Therefore, we posit that to be able to develop a holistic perspective of the knowledge coordination 
process we need to add the who dimension to the how, the what, and the when dimensions of knowledge 
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coordination suggested in the work of Faraj and Xiao (2006). In line with this conceptualization of the 
knowledge coordination process as addressing the what, how, when, and who dimensions, our first aim 
in this study is to identify the practices that both traditional and fast-response organizations enact in their 
coordination of the how, what, when, and who of knowledge, and how these practices might differ 
between these kinds of organizations. Therefore, we specify our overarching research question in the 
following two research questions: 
RQ1: What practices can be distinguished in terms of the “how”, “what”, “when”, and “who” dimensions 
of knowledge coordination?  
RQ2: How do these practices differ between traditional and fast-response organizations? 
Knowledge Coordination Practices under Normal and Emergency Operating 
Conditions 
Although the distinction between traditional and fast-response organizations is very relevant in terms of 
knowledge coordination, we feel a more fine-grained distinction is called for. After all, the conditions that 
Faraj and Xiao (2006) identified for fast-response organizations (high uncertainty, fast decision making, 
mistakes can be catastrophic) are also valid for emergency situations in traditional organizations. A bank, 
for instance, can also be confronted with an emergency (the collapse of the financial market, or the 
electronic banking system being hacked) in which fast-response and error-free activities are crucial for the 
organization’s survival or the integrity of customer data. Conversely, a fast-response organization is not 
always in emergency mode: even fire fighters, Emergency Room physicians and military personnel have 
routine processes and procedures guiding the non-emergency part of their day-to-day work. Therefore, 
additional to the distinction between fast-response and traditional organizations, we make a distinction 
between normal and emergency operating conditions within these organizations, as these conditions are 
likely to put different demands on knowledge coordination. Exactly how these demands change, however, 
is unclear. Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008), for instance, found that professionals tend to prefer their 
own personal networks over formal organizational structures for the rapid ad-hoc knowledge 
collaboration required by emergencies. Similarly, Majchrzak et al. (2007) discussed how emergency 
situations lead to a shift from formal mechanisms and shared mental models towards action-based 
coordination through dialogic practices. As noted above, however, Faraj and Xiao (2006) stated that 
emergencies create a coordination dilemma, requiring tight structuring, formal coordination, and 
hierarchical decision making, as well as flexible structures, on-the-spot decision making, and informal 
coordination. Thus, it is especially interesting to analyze how knowledge coordination changes when an 
emergency happens – i.e., when an organization (either traditional or fast-response) moves from a normal 
operational condition to an emergency.  This leads to our third research question: 
RQ3: How do knowledge coordination practices change when operating conditions change from normal 
to emergency? 
Although both traditional and fast-response organizations experience normal as well as emergency 
operating conditions, they are likely to deal quite differently with an emergency situation. Obviously, 
emergencies are much more common for fast-response organizations than for traditional organizations, 
as they are confronted with unpredictable environmental demands on a much more frequent basis. Even 
for these organizations, though, we expect to see differences in knowledge coordination practices when 
operating conditions change into a more urgent emergency. Faraj and Xiao (2006), for instance, 
discussed how the trauma center they studied relies on expertise coordination practices when things 
follow the habitual trajectory (which would still mean a high need for fast-response and error-free 
actions), but when a deviation from the trajectory takes place (e.g., a patient does not respond to 
treatment as planned), dialogic coordination practices become prominent. Though Faraj and Xiao (2006) 
did not distinguish explicitly between different degrees of urgency (when what knowledge needs to be 
coordinated) in situations they observed (i.e., “normal” and “emergency” conditions according to the 
terminology we use in this paper), their empirical findings showed that structured coordination that relies 
on a range of pre-defined formal mechanisms (Okhuysen et al. 2009) co-exists with more improvised 
ways of coordinating knowledge (e.g., Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2007; Kotlarsky et al. 2014; Majchrzak et 
al. 2007) in fast-response organizations.  
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 Turning to traditional organizations: they often have bureaucratic structures and processes that 
lack the flexibility to formally respond to sudden crises, which necessitates them to turn to alternative 
forms of organization and coordination when an emergency does arise (Bigley and Roberts 2001). 
Therefore, although both fast-response and traditional organizations are likely to change the execution of 
knowledge coordination practices in response to an emergency situation, the exact nature of these 
changes in both types of organizations is unclear. This leads to our fourth research question: 
RQ4: How do the changes in knowledge coordination practices from normal to emergency situations 
differ between traditional and fast-response organizations? In the next section we explain how we 
designed our empirical research to address the four research questions outlined above, and the methods 
we used to collect and analyze the data.  
Research Design and Methods 
Research Design 
We adopted a case study approach, which advances understanding of a particular phenomenon by 
investigating it in its real-life context (Eisenhardt 1989; Lee and  Baskerville 2003; Yin 2003). This 
approach has been traditionally used to study knowledge-related issues in organizational settings (e.g., 
Faraj and Xiao 2006; Majchrzak et al. 2012; Kotlarsky et al. 2014). We designed our empirical 
investigation to allow us to study in depth (1) how knowledge coordination practices change between 
normal and emergency operating conditions, and (2) how findings compare between traditional and fast-
response organizations. In particular, we have studied two separate IT divisions that fit the characteristics 
of traditional and fast-response organizations and in each of these two divisions we established what 
constitutes normal and emergency operating conditions (as we elaborate below). Therefore, in terms of 
analysis, we treated one organization under a specific operating condition as a “case study”, which implies 
we had four individual case studies which we compared. First, we focused on within-case analysis to 
address RQ1 and second, conducted cross-case analysis to address RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4.  
Empirical Setting 
The study site, Sigma (a pseudonym – as are all names used in this paper), is a large European 
Governmental IT Service Organization, part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of a European country. 
Sigma has approximately 1,900 employees who maintain over 70,000 workstations across the globe, the 
underlying IT infrastructure and hundreds of software applications. The organization also delivers 
additional (IT-related) services such as conducting analyses, giving advice, delivering hard- and software 
solutions and developing specific applications. Sigma is the internal Information Technology provider of 
the MoD, but also delivers services to other Ministries. 
 Sigma is divided into two separate organizations, one responsible for all IT products and services 
in the civil (non-operational/bureaucratic) domain – Civit, and one responsible for all IT products and 
services in the operational domain – Milit. Due to the nature of the work context of Milit, concerning the 
IT provision for military operations and missions, we can classify this organization as a fast-response 
organization (Faraj and Xiao 2006). Milit often deals with time-critical and complex situations where 
there is no room for mistakes as for example, a lack of connection in the operational field may actually 
cost lives. Civit, on the other hand, is a traditional (hierarchical) organization. However, employees at 
Civit also periodically deal with emergency situations where connections fail and consequences can be 
disastrous, though (usually) not life threatening. Both organizations are physically located throughout the 
country in diverse military bases and across the globe in former colonies of the European country. Table 1 
summarizes key characteristics of the two organizations and highlights differences between them, 
including different interpretations of “emergency” operating conditions.   
 
Table 1. Company background, Civit and Milit 
 Civilian IT Division: Civit Military IT Division: Milit 
Type of organization Traditional  Fast-response 
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Number of employees ~1,700 ~200 
Nature of the work Responsible for all IT in peace 
situations 
Responsible for all IT in military 
operations and missions 
Clients All employees of Armed Forces 
Departments working in peace time, 
other ministries of the country 
All deployed employees part of 
the Armed Forces Departments 
% of military employees (in active 
duty or previous duty) 
~22% ~83% 
Nature of an “emergency” situation Event/situation that presents a 
(serious) disruption to running 
“business-as-usual”  
Event/situation that requires 
immediate/urgent action  
 
Organizational objective when 
facing an “emergency” 
To resolve the disruption as soon as 
possible and return to normal 
operation 
Accomplish the urgent task in an 
effective and efficient manner 
Data Collection  
As we intended to compare knowledge coordination during normal and emergency situations, in the first 
few meetings with top managers when we discussed the scope and other arrangements for data collection 
(where two authors participated), we established a clear understanding between “normal” and 
“emergency” operating conditions, as perceived by each organization. Later, we asked interviewees for 
additional clarifications and specific examples of situations when they faced conditions of emergency.  
 Data was collected over a 14-month time period between March 2011 and May 2012. We 
conducted 33 in-depth semi-structured interviews with employees from all hierarchical layers of the 
organization and in different functional roles. Interviews lasted between 45 to 120 minutes, focusing on 
understanding the various activities and situations in which interviewees were involved in their daily work 
in order to effectively share and coordinate knowledge. Most of the interviews were taped and transcribed 
verbatim. The first author also spent time talking to employees informally, joining them for lunches 
during her visits to different military bases. She also participated in several management team meetings 
as an observer. In addition to the interviews and observations, we also gained insight into the formal 
meeting structure at both organizations and examined documents describing projects (e.g., project 
initiation documents, “PID”), work instructions (extended documents containing examples for several 
functional roles) and process guidelines. These documents provided important contextual information 
about the organization and were used for triangulation.   
 During the interviews we discussed normal and emergency conditions separately. Interview 
questions aimed to capture the who, how, what, and when dimensions of knowledge coordination, 
starting by asking the interviewee to whom they turn when (s)he needs specific knowledge or advice, and 
with whom (s)he shares knowledge. We asked about reasons and considerations that influence the choice 
of a specific individual over other colleagues as a source of knowledge. When we established an immediate 
knowledge coordination circle of an interviewee, we expanded our questions to explore what (context) 
knowledge, when (under which circumstances or situations) and how (actions or mechanisms) is 
coordinated within their circle. 
Data Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software for qualitative data analysis. Data analysis 
followed several steps. Through sorting and refining themes emerging from the data, we applied axial 
coding for the emerging topics (Miles and Huberman 1994). Based on successive reviews of interview 
transcripts, documents, notes, and summaries of observations, we started grouping codes into themes. 
Two authors engaged in several rounds of intensive discussions that lasted over several months during 
which they re-examined emerging topics, referred back to codes and re-analyzed the data. Through this 
iterative process, we identified knowledge coordination activities (different sets of activities associated 
with Civit and Milit). These activities were grouped into themes that distinguish between four types of 
knowledge coordination practices: prioritizing tasks, following procedures, using roles and 
responsibilities, and utilizing networks. These four themes were evident in both normal and emergency 
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operating conditions; however, they relied on different sets of activities under different operating 
conditions. 
 In line with our research design, we conducted cross-case analysis to compare knowledge 
coordination practices and the activities they comprised of between different organizations, and different 
operating conditions. We report our findings in the following sections. 
Findings and Analysis 
Background to Normal and Emergency Situations in Civit and Milit 
Both organizations dealt with emergency situations, but the impact of these was different on both the 
organization and its employees. In Civit when something disrupts its normal operating conditions (i.e., all 
or a large part of the organization is not able to function), the organization is considered to face an 
emergency which needs to be resolved so that normal operations can be restored. In Milit, however, 
“emergencies” are urgent tasks (typically associated with military missions) that need to be accomplished 
in an effective and efficient manner. Such tasks are of immediate priority for Milit. Although what exactly 
constitutes an “emergency” in both organizations may be different, for both organizations it means a 
deviation from “business as usual”. 
A Repertoire of Knowledge Coordination Practices 
Through the data analysis, we have identified four knowledge coordination practices. The first practice, 
prioritizing tasks, aims to establish what knowledge will be coordinated and when this coordination is 
to take place, which is decided based on an assessment of the relative importance of the knowledge-
intensive tasks associated with on-going projects. The second practice, following procedures, 
concerns a range of activities that offer formal approaches to establishing what knowledge should be 
coordinated in which manner (i.e., how). The third practice, using roles and responsibilities, 
concerns knowledge coordination activities that establish who should be responsible for coordinating 
what (i.e., specific) knowledge or who is likely to be an expert in what based on matching someone’s role 
or area of responsibility with expertise that fulfilling this role/responsibility would require. The fourth 
practice, utilizing networks, focuses on formal and informal links between individuals to determine 
who could coordinate what knowledge in which manner/through which channels (i.e., how), in particular 
when quick access to relevant knowledge is required. 
 While all four practices address the what dimension of knowledge which is concerned with the 
specific knowledge domain or task-specific context, each practice is unique in addressing a combination of 
dimensions that together support the knowledge coordination process as it unfolds over time (what and 
when; what and how; what and who; what, how and who).  
 The higher-level knowledge coordination practices, being structured or improvised, are relevant 
to both organizations under both operating conditions. However, activities that constitute these practices 
do differ between the two organizations and operating conditions. In the following four sections we 
analyze each knowledge coordination practice, focusing on activities through which these practices are 
enacted in both organizations, and how they differ under different operating conditions. Tables 3 and 4, 
included at the end of this section, summarize activities comprising the four knowledge coordination 
practices in Civit and Milit under different operating conditions. 
Practice 1: Prioritizing Tasks (The What and When Dimensions) 
Under normal conditions, Civit’s main priority is maintaining 70,000 workstations and a multitude of IT 
systems. Incoming IT-related requests from clients (clients can be internal within Civit, external within 
the MoD, or external organizations) can be standard (e.g., setting up a new workstation for a new 
employee), non-standard (e.g., a request for a new custom-made application), or a project (e.g., a set of 
computers and infrastructure need to be delivered to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a special 
occasion). For standard and non-standard projects, there are set rules and regulations regarding the time 
to deliver the requested need based upon the impact of the problem for the user of the system. Project 
delivery times are negotiated with some clients, and products and services delivery times for other clients 
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are covered in service level agreements (SLAs). Priorities are discussed during formal work meetings and 
tasks are carried out according to the set times. The agreed priorities define when particular knowledge 
(what) is required to accomplish a specific task. 
 When an incident or calamity happens in Civit, however, this triggers the need to urgently 
respond to avoid further disaster. Therefore, tasks associated with resolving the emergency situation 
become the first priority. For example, when a whole system shuts down and thousands of employees are 
without a network connection, priorities on standard and non-standard requests and projects are put 
aside and the situation at hand will be dealt with ‘‘right now’’. In such situations, knowledge about the 
what (the calamity) defines the emergency situation, i.e., when (right now). What sometimes happens 
within Civit is that, due to time pressure and busy schedules, during formal meetings some priorities are 
misaligned with reality or overlooked. As one of the Product Managers at Civit noted: 
No one sets priorities, everybody keeps shouting, emailing, and calling and, in the end, no 
decisions are taken. Some tasks are ignored under pressure, like extensive maintenance of 
systems.  
As a result, certain tasks remain “on the shelf” until they become the source of an incident. Then they 
receive a red flag, become a calamity, and suddenly rise to the top of the to-do list of the organization.  
 In Milit, under normal conditions, the work is structured and priorities are negotiated in a similar 
manner as in Civit. In particular, Milit employees often deal with similar requests as their Civit colleagues; 
but work within Milit usually concerns military-operation IT systems and clients who work in military 
active missions or training areas. The way Milit employees deal with incoming requests is somewhat 
different from Civit, as becomes evident from the list of activities included in Table 4. For example, Milit 
has so-called morning prayers at several locations, where every morning at 7:45 AM, tasks and projects 
are discussed and priorities are set for both the short and long(-er) term.  
 Under emergency circumstances, tasks must be carried out immediately, putting ongoing tasks 
and projects on hold. Prioritizing in Milit is driven by the importance or severity of a situation associated 
with a specific client. Milit internally refers to this as a ‘‘client-based perspective’’. For example, a router 
that is malfunctioning leaving one agent in a military activity zone without a connection may be much 
more important than a malfunctioning router that serves 50 individuals in a safe location. As Head of 
Operations Room at Milit explained: 
You should not assess the situation based on whether this is one workstation that does not work, or 
here we have 20 workstations that do not work. No, you should keep the client perspective in mind 
and assess the importance of the situation and when that single workstation is more important than 
those other 20, then those 20 will just have to wait a little while. If you look at it from an IT network 
perspective, and you have never been on a mission and don’t know the backgrounds, you only see 20 
people without a connection and you think that needs to be solved first.  
Unlike Civit, where prioritization in emergency situations becomes an issue, in Milit the highest in rank 
decides what to do, and instructs the others down the pyramid accordingly. However, decision makers do 
listen to the experts when it comes to dealing with certain situations; so, where possible, consultation and 
verification takes place with the expert on the topic  
Practice 2: Following Procedures (The What and How Dimensions) 
Procedures are important when it comes to coordinating the knowledge and skills required to execute 
different tasks. Organizational members base their decisions regarding how to search for required skills 
and relevant expertise on formal procedures, and the extent to which they believe these formal procedures 
must be followed. In the bureaucratic and large Civit organization, employees are expected to follow 
formal procedures at all times. Procedures are institutionalized through ITIL (Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library), which is a set of practices for IT service management that focuses on aligning IT 
services with the business, PRINCE (projects in controlled environments, a project management 
methodology), as well as through securing deliveries to clients via SLAs (Service Level Agreements). 
 However, when facing a crisis situation, formal procedures are discarded. In Civit, in crisis 
situations, formal procedures are often replaced with a “carte blanche”, which means that any possible 
means are legitimate, as long as they help to resolve the situation. As one Senior Project Manager 
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commented: “We don’t have to go through 16 steps before reaching an ‘approval’ state.” Our analysis 
shows that, in Civit, formal procedures are designed for normal conditions, which break down in critical 
situations that require urgent action. However, there are no “emergency” procedures to kick in under such 
circumstances. Therefore, formal procedures are replaced by shorter, much more informal and 
improvised approaches.  
 In Milit, following formal procedures is very important under both normal and, even more so, 
emergency conditions. Because of the nature of the military work, Milit has a zero-tolerance policy for 
mistakes regarding many procedures. This means that, when it comes to classified projects or services, 
every step of the process must to be followed “to the letter”. 
 The military way of doing things is illustrated in the following quote: “Under operational 
[emergency] circumstances it’s important to go through the plan-do-check-act phases as soon as 
possible, in order to stay ahead of your opponent” (Senior Program Manager at Civit, military). In 
emergency situations, military employees greatly rely on formal structures and protocols that define 
knowledge flows (i.e., which party is responsible for what knowledge, and how knowledge from different 
parties will be integrated). So where, in Civit, the formal procedures are shortened by taking out steps or 
replacing with informal ones, in Milit, procedures followed in emergencies are even more formal. 
 The way in which organizational members use these formal procedures is closely linked to the 
formalization of roles (“Forward, march! says the general”).  
Practice 3: Using Roles and Responsibilities (The What and Who Dimensions) 
To engage in knowledge coordination, organizational members need to be aware of who holds what 
knowledge, and based on this awareness, retrieve the knowledge to solve their problem or work-related 
issue. They develop knowledge about who-knows-what in a variety of ways: e.g., through perceptions of 
the relative expertise of others which is usually associated with formal roles and responsibilities, or 
through stereotyping.  
 In Civit, the assignment of roles and responsibilities is formalized by the RACI matrix that 
captures four key dimensions of involvement with a task: responsible, accountable, consulted, and 
informed (RACI). These dimensions provide the hierarchical role index where a role is a descriptor of an 
associated set of tasks that can be performed by many people and one person can perform many roles. 
The organization relies on formalized procedures describing which role (person in this role) to contact in 
which situation/for specific information. One Product Manager at Civit provided an example: 
Once, when I had to request a rental [telephone] line at K [supplier], our Information 
Security Officer told us that we were not allowed to exchange information via regular 
email, because it contained Defense location information that must not become available to 
‘the wider public’. In such situations the exchange goes through sealed letters, which take 
five days to send and receive an answer. I needed a tool through which I could send 
encrypted [secured] emails and for this, I needed to contact our Information Service 
Specialist and tell him the tools I needed him to deliver to me.  
Under normal circumstances, the assignment of a person (who) to a task is based on their formal role and 
function and is matched with their expertise (what). The experience of the employee with the type of 
project, or the client, also plays an important role. Within several sub-departments of Civit, initiatives 
were put forward to capture all employees’ expertise, skills, and experiences with clients in a system 
combined with educational details in order to facilitate the search for information.  
 Civit, being a large IT maintenance organization with many hierarchical layers, formalized a 
number of “crisis roles” such as Crisis Manager and Escalation Manager, which have been 
institutionalized to deal with crisis and emergency situations. These crisis roles come on top of other 
(“normal”) responsibilities that these individuals deal with on a daily basis. One Escalation Manager 
described his role: “I am a hub, connecting people, building bridges, resolving issues.” He knows he 
cannot act under time pressure in too complex situations; but he is active in managing part of the 
complexity of situations within the organization. 
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 What actually happens when a crisis occurs in Civit is that the crisis mandate effectuates and 
organizational members have complete freedom (carte blanche − i.e., unrestricted power to act at one’s 
own discretion) when it comes to assigning people to a certain task to get things done.   
 In Milit, employees are recognizable according to their uniform, indicating from which Armed 
Forces Division (Navy, Army, Air Force) they stem, and their “stars and stripes” indicating their rank. 
Only 17% of this organization is civilian personnel, so most people wear a military uniform. A uniform 
provides a good indication of a person’s background and experience, both in terms of client information 
(as the uniform corresponds to the Armed Forces Division, which are all clients of the Milit organization) 
and years of experience within the Defense organization (rank approximately indicates tenure in the 
Armed Forces), but not necessarily their role or function in the Milit IT department. Under normal 
circumstances, organizational members at Milit rely on formal roles that are associated with specific 
functions. The allocation of tasks can be both person-based (i.e., targeted to a specific individual) as well 
as expertise-based. Person-based allocation is related to the role or responsibility a specific person is 
assigned to, which is similar to Civit, while expertise-based allocation is related to a specific task to which 
an individual with relevant expertise is assigned when the task (usually a problem or issue) is being 
raised. In particular, when expertise is needed to address a high priority issue, a fast response can be 
counted on when sending out an email with a request for information to a functional email box instead of 
approaching a specific person.  
When a situation shifts to an emergency, the reliance on roles and responsibilities within this organization 
shifts from a formal cooperation mode to “hierarchy and command”. As one of the interviewees explains: 
First your name is just Leonie, and I am Captain Rallph. Suddenly things do not work 
anymore and then the boss says ‘Lieutenant Houtman’. It is at that moment when he calls 
you by your rank and last name that he invokes his rank and you have sworn to blindly 
follow a higher rank. (Senior Technical Specialist at Milit)  
There is a clear formalization in case of incidents or emergencies; the organization has institutionalized 
several mechanisms to ensure a direct response in case of an emergency. This is a 24/7 organization; 
employees are trained for and used to this context and rely on their formal roles to deal with emergencies. 
Practice 4: Utilizing Networks (The What, How, and Who Dimensions) 
In order to retrieve knowledge, answer a question or request relevant information, organizational 
members must be aware of who holds this information (what), and they need to use the appropriate 
communication channels (how) to get this information. 
 Within Civit, under normal conditions, employees mainly follow the formal line and use formal 
networks to find relevant expertise within the organization. This bureaucratic department 
institutionalized a very formal system through which every step is monitored or “otherwise we lose 
control” (Process Manager). As individuals work together on joint projects, they get to know one another 
and their areas of expertise, and they use this knowledge at a later stage to contact their peers when 
relevant expertise is required. Through such shared experiences informal networks emerge. Indeed, some 
people are very active in forming informal networks across the organization: 
When I look at my own function [Product Group Manager], I ‘network my ass off’ to get the 
best possible informal and ‘like knows like’ network. That also means I actively contribute 
to these networks. Anyone can call me at any time with questions such as ‘I have a 
problem…’, ‘Can you help me with this and that?’, ‘How would you do this?’. 
When a certain situation escalates, employees seem to rely even more on their personal informal networks 
to quickly access relevant knowledge. Because incidents and emergencies require rapid action and there is 
no time to verify expertise and get approvals through the formal procedures, people can only go to those 
whom they know and trust as an expert in a particular area. Considering the crisis mandate (carte blanche 
– explained earlier), the formal procedures are avoided in order to get access to the right expertise 
quickly. Therefore, informal networks are key when it comes to knowledge coordination in emergency 
situations. 
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 In Milit, when it comes to the utilization of networks under normal conditions, both formal and 
informal networks are utilized by employees to retrieve relevant knowledge. As one Senior Project 
Manager explained:  
If you work on a project and you need a satellite, you probably need to find a Transmission 
Specialist. So, if you do not know people that well, you rely on their formal function title 
and thus formal network. That is how you start; later on you develop the more informal 
networks.  
Unlike Civit, where informal networks are built through shared experiences of working together, in Milit 
employees often share similar experiences that were accumulated separately by having been at the same 
place or situation, rather than by active collaboration. For example, military employees share experiences 
if they have attended the same military training, or participated in the same military mission. Such shared 
experiences are evoked by recognizing the same uniform (internally referred to as “blood groups”) or 
rank: these create trust and, to some extent, a perception of their relative expertise. Stereotyping plays a 
role as visual attributes such as rank and uniform are utilized in forming opinions about the person who is 
wearing the uniform. These mutual experiences are utilized in informal as well as formal networks.   
 According to the military principle (captured in the Code of Conduct to which military employees 
swear to obey), obeying orders and following procedures is key to knowledge coordination when it comes 
to solving problems under emergency situations. In accordance with this principle, the formalized way of 
coordinating knowledge is evident under emergency conditions in Milit. Employees follow strict 
instructions in complex situations and do not deviate from the formal line of command in these 
conditions. Unlike Civit, where formal networks are replaced by informal ones under emergency 
situations, in Milit formal networks become even stricter as they purely rely on ranks and the hierarchical 
chain of command. Ranks and military protocols define who is in charge in emergency situations and who 
is following whose command. Who-knows-whom and inter-personal relationships are abandoned and 
only orders and protocols invoked through the formal chain of command are followed.    
Summary of Activities Comprising Knowledge Coordination Practices 
Derived from the findings and analysis presented above, the following two tables summarize activities 
that constitute knowledge coordination practices in the two organizations (Civit in Table 2 and Milit in 
Table 3). 
Table 2. Activities Comprising Knowledge Coordination Practices within Civit 
Knowledge 
Coordination 
Practices 
Activities comprising knowledge coordination practices – Civit 
Normal conditions Emergency conditions 
Prioritizing tasks 
(what & when) 
- Using formal meetings to negotiate or 
impose priorities of tasks 
- Using Standard Requests, Non-
Standard Requests and Projects  
- Using Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
to set standards in solving problems 
- (Always) putting incidents and calamities 
first (no time to negotiate other priorities 
of tasks) 
- (Sometimes) exercising power to 
accelerate action: “the one who shouts 
the loudest”  
- Systems are used to register incidents, 
but do not prioritize them 
Following 
procedures 
(what & how) 
- Following formal procedures and 
processes  
- Through ITIL, PRINCE and SLAs 
- Using carte blanche (crisis mandate) 
- Looking for informal ways to resolve the 
situation (work around the formal line) 
- Remove steps, “ignore” procedures 
Using roles and  
responsibilities 
(what & who) 
- Relying on a person’s functional 
(formal) role (RACI matrix) 
- Using digital directories/databases to 
find relevant person according to 
his/her role/responsibility 
- Assigning tasks according to experience  
- Institutionalizing crisis “functions”: 
Crisis Managers and Escalation 
Managers 
- Acting based on situation at hand and 
“who is available” (no time to formally 
assign responsibilities) 
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- Through meetings responsibilities are 
assigned to people 
- Using carte blanche or crisis mandate  
Utilizing 
networks 
(what, how & 
who) 
- Following the formal and hierarchical 
lines 
- Using informal networks to “work 
around” the formal organization  
- (Mainly) using informal networks to 
retrieve relevant knowledge as people do 
not have time to verify expertise or build 
trust 
- Reliance on “people we know and trust” 
 
Table 3. Activities Comprising Knowledge Coordination Practices within Milit 
Knowledge 
Coordination 
Practices 
Activities comprising knowledge coordination practices – Milit 
Normal conditions Emergency conditions 
Prioritizing tasks 
(what & when) 
- Using formal meetings and “morning 
prayers” to prioritize tasks  
- Using Standard Requests, Non-
Standard Requests and Projects 
- Using SLAs to set standards in solving 
problems for clients 
- Relying on formal mechanisms; putting 
incidents and accidents first 
- Confirming to highest in command who 
decides (but also consults with the 
experts) 
Following 
procedures 
(what & how) 
- Relying on formal procedures, 
especially those concerned with 
confidential processes 
- Through ITIL, PRINCE and SLAs 
- Relying on a very formal approach: plan-
do-check-act  
- Relying on formal structures and 
protocols 
- Having zero tolerance for mistakes 
(attitude) 
Using roles and  
responsibilities 
(what & who) 
- Relying on visual indicators such as 
person’s uniform which indicates 
background, experience and rank to 
“interpret” a person’s 
role/responsibility 
- Relying on a person’s functional 
(formal) role 
- Using digital directories e.g., functional 
email boxes 
- Assigning tasks according to experience 
with a specific client 
- Using “morning prayers” to discuss and 
assign responsibilities  
- Following “command and control” which 
relies on exercising power based on rank 
and role and obeying orders (uniformity) 
- Responsibilities are associated with the 
uniform: the higher the rank, the more 
responsibilities 
- Using digital directories such as 
functional email boxes to ensure direct 
response (staffed 24/7)  
Utilizing 
networks 
(what, how & 
who) 
- Using formal networks that are 
associated with formal procedures 
- Using informal networks built through 
shared or similar experiences, creating 
trust 
- “Enforcing” utilization of formal 
networks only 
- Building trust through reliance on 
uniforms, rank and formal military 
procedures 
Discussion and Contribution 
Our findings suggest that knowledge coordination is accomplished through four higher-level coordination 
practices – prioritizing tasks, following procedures, using roles and responsibilities, and utilizing 
networks. While each of these four practices addresses different combinations of the what, when, how, 
and who dimensions of knowledge coordination, interactions between these practices provide a dynamic 
perspective on the knowledge coordination process as it unfolds over time in organizations that operate 
under normal as well as emergency conditions.  
The main contribution of our findings is that we find that the way knowledge coordination practices 
differ between normal and emergency situations is markedly different for traditional and fast-response 
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organizations. All four knowledge coordination practices are present in both traditional and fast-response 
organizations, under normal and emergency conditions. However, the activities constituting the practices, 
as well as the way in which the repertoire of coordinative activities change when operating conditions 
change from normal to an emergency, differ between the two organization types as depicted in Tables 2 
and 3. When circumstances change from normal to emergency we see clear differences in the pattern of 
knowledge coordination practices enactment, as summarized in Table 4.  
• In a traditional organization, the largely formal structures and processes that are present under 
normal conditions are replaced by more improvised and informal knowledge coordination practices to 
resolve the emergency.  
• In a fast-response organization, the largely formal knowledge coordination practices become even 
more structured and formalized under emergency conditions.  
 
Table 4. Main Characteristics of Knowledge Coordination Processes under Normal and 
Emergency Conditions in Traditional and Fast-Response Organizations 
 Normal conditions Emergency conditions 
Traditional 
organization 
• Largely structured knowledge 
coordination practices 
• Personal networks are used to 
speed things up 
• Largely improvised and informal 
knowledge coordination practices aimed 
at resolving the emergency 
• Personal networks are dominant 
 
Fast-response 
organization 
• Largely structured knowledge 
coordination practices 
• Informal networks rely on joint 
experiences and visual indicators 
(uniform) of similar experiences 
• Highly structured and formal 
knowledge coordination practices aimed 
at achieving best performance 
• Informal networks cease to exist  
 
 
The two types of organizations typically have a different interpretation of what an emergency means. This 
emphasizes the importance of not only looking at different types of organizations, or different types of 
situations, but to combine both dimensions. Where an emergency situation represents a (serious) 
disruption in a traditional organization that leads to a complete shift in organization and an abandonment 
of formal structures and processes, the fast-response organization reacts in a more prepared and 
organized way, speeding up activities and processes in order to resolve the situation and return to normal 
day-to-day business. The fast-response organization treats emergency conditions as an urgent but still a 
routine part of their daily activities (Bechky and Okhuysen 2011), but as a sort of intensified routine. 
Similar to high reliability organizations, the fast-response organization portrays resilience in their ability 
to recover from incidents (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011), enacted through formalized routines and activities. 
In the traditional organization, on the other hand, structures and hierarchy dissolve into informal 
networks that enable ad-hoc collaborations with known and trustworthy people to resolve the situation at 
hand, putting formalities aside.  
Integrating Conditions for Coordination 
The differing patterns in knowledge coordination we have observed when operating conditions change 
can be explained through the lens of three integrating conditions for coordination identified by Okhuysen 
and Bechky (2009): accountability, predictability, and common understanding. They argue that these 
conditions – “means by which people collectively accomplish their interdependent tasks in the workplace” 
(p. 483) – can be accomplished through a variety of coordinative actions or mechanisms. Thus in different 
situations individuals may choose to enact different coordination mechanisms, drawing from the wide 
range of options available for them. However, to ensure that coordination efforts will be successful (i.e., 
will deliver the desired outcome), the choice of coordination mechanisms should aim to create the 
integrating conditions for coordination. In the light of this theoretical lens, our findings indicate under 
normal conditions knowledge coordination practices enacted by Civit and Milit personnel create the three 
integrating conditions for coordination. When operating conditions change to emergency, Milit personnel 
are able to create accountability, common understanding and predictability by relying on different (more 
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formal) coordination activities. Civit staff, however, face major breakdown in accountability, predictability 
and common understanding, which triggers the need to improvise and engage in informal ways to resolve 
emergency situations. We discuss each integrating condition below in greater details.  
Accountability emerges from identifying the person responsible for a specific task or outcome. 
This may arise from the formal hierarchy, but it can also be established via discussions, meetings and 
action (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). In the fast-response organization, the person responsible for the 
organizational outcome is the person who is the highest in rank. When the impact of a given situation is 
high (e.g., during an emergency) and there is a need for immediate action, this rank-based control 
structure is amplified and people tend to rely on their and others’ “stars” and “stripes” (or other 
indicators of hierarchy/seniority) and, consequently, their knowledge. On the other hand, in a traditional 
organization, people start to take action and feel responsible, primarily, based on informal perceptions of 
power and/or expertise: who is in control of the situation at hand and who has the right knowledge to deal 
with the situation. The deviation from formal knowledge coordination mechanisms replaces formal 
accountability (associated with specific roles) with ad-hoc attempts to assume or allocate accountability 
for action. Such attempts are likely to create chaos and anarchy (e.g., “who shouts the loudest”), but also 
may occasionally facilitate organic emergence of accountability and leadership by informal recognition of 
expertise among individuals.    
 Predictability enables organizational members to anticipate any given situation and subsequent 
tasks and activities by knowing the likelihood of occurrence (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Being able to 
anticipate deviating situations allows people to adapt quickly to the situation at hand, allocating the right 
people, resources and knowledge to resolve the emergency. Having knowledge of these kinds of patterns 
or sequence of tasks is defined by the degree of preparedness. Here it becomes evident that, within the 
fast-response military organization, the predictability is high, allowing for a better anticipation of 
knowledge coordination requirements in extreme situations, as personnel are trained for this extensively. 
By definition, a fast-response organization requires such preparedness, to allow the employees to adapt 
quickly to new situations. In the traditional organization knowledge practices are designed to facilitate 
knowledge coordination under normal conditions. Any unexpected events affect personnel’s ability to 
predict future tasks and actions. Responses to emergencies in traditional organizations, therefore, differ 
from fast-response organizations as their degree of familiarity with these kinds of situations is low. As a 
result, knowledge coordination takes place in an ad-hoc and improvised manner. Repeated interactions in 
such emergent situations do, however, improve coordinative action in terms of predictability (e.g., what to 
expect from specific individuals) in consequent situations (Reagans et al. 2005).    
  Finally, common understanding is accomplished when organizational members develop a shared 
perspective on the goals and outputs of their interdependent work, and how their individual tasks fit 
within the whole (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Extensive training of people in fast-response 
organizations already instates a common understanding of planning for emergencies and the rules to 
abide to. For example, training that all military employees go through creates common ground across all 
staff in terms of organizational culture and code of conduct; it enhances familiarity with possible 
operating conditions and who fulfills which task in the whole process. Training serves as a coordination 
mechanism that ensures a minimum threshold of common understanding for staff in a fast-response 
organization. However, in a traditional organization, there is no such advanced shared training to 
enhance common understanding about which knowledge to coordinate and familiarity with the standard 
practices. In comparison to fast-response organizations where employees are going through intensive 
training before they assume their job position, in traditional organizations employees start their jobs with 
minimal or no training. Therefore, they typically learn about organizational culture and institutional 
practices over time, through interactions with their co-workers and engagements in daily work-practices 
and routines. The reliance on formal roles and documents describing the company’s policy and objectives 
helps to develop a shared understanding of the work itself and how it must be executed; however, such 
resources do not prepare employees for dealing with emergency situations.  
Other differences between traditional and fast-response organizations that can explain the diverging 
patterns of change in knowledge coordination practices when emergencies arise can be identified as well. 
For instance, differences in culture between traditional and fast-response organizations mean that these 
organizations have different perceptions of uncertainty and that uncertainty triggers different behaviors 
(Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011). Different cultures are also related to differences in decision making – for 
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fast-response organizations, non-routine decision making (less bound by rules and customs) is much 
more common than for traditional organizations. Finally, the orchestration of knowledge resources and 
flows is also likely to be different in traditional versus fast-response organizations. Orchestration refers to 
the structuring, bundling and leveraging of organizational resources (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland and Gilbert, 
2011). In an emergency situation, such orchestration takes place in a much more top-down way in a fast-
response organization, and in a more informal and bottom-up way in a traditional organization. How 
these, and other, factors explain the diverging changes in knowledge coordination practices between 
traditional and fast-response organizations is a subject for future research. 
Conclusions and Practical Implications 
The dynamics of the knowledge coordination process change as organizations face different operating 
conditions. Traditional organizations see a shift from tightly coupled, formal modes of coordination to 
more loosely coupled, informal ones. Fast-response organizations, on the other hand, shift from formal 
and structured coordination modes to even more formal and tightly structured modes when facing 
emergency conditions. The practices underlying the knowledge coordination process are the same for 
both types of organizations, as well as under both operating conditions; knowledge is coordinated by: 
prioritizing tasks, following procedures, using roles and responsibilities, and utilizing networks. 
However, specific activities comprising the four practices are different for both types of IT organizations 
and operating conditions.  
 For managers, our findings can provide indications on how to manage knowledge coordination 
and be better prepared for emergencies. For instance, traditional organizations may be able to learn from 
fast-response organizations in terms of more structured approaches towards emergencies, adapting the 
integrating conditions for coordination in order to become more resilient: improving accountability by 
establishing clear roles and responsibilities for emergencies, enhancing predictability by finding ways for 
structural learning from emergencies (Cooke and Rohleder 2006; Haunschild and Sullivan 2002), and 
increasing common understanding through training for emergencies. On the other hand, too much 
structure and preparedness may negatively affect the improvisation and creativity that can help find novel 
solutions for novel problems.   
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